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CURRENT CASES
THE DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS BY AN
EMPLOYEE IN THE CONTEXT OF A JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING: A BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY OR
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION? 1TT Telecom Products
Corporation v. Dooley, 214 Cal. App. 3d 307 (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
You are engaged in a lawsuit with a potential competitor and
your opponent hires one of your former employees as an expert
consultant. This former employee not only helps your opponent
in litigation, but also discloses some of your company's trade
secrets' in the process.
As an employer, what recourse do you have against this former em-
ployee? Furthermore, what injunctive power do you have to pre-
vent the employee from disclosing information during the judicial
proceeding? The case of ITT Telecom Products Corporation v.
Dooley2 holds that an employer cannot prevent a former employee
from disclosing trade secrets during a judicial proceeding unless the
employer had a written contract with the employee prohibiting such
a disclosure. Absent such an agreement, the disclosure would be a
"privileged communication" made in a judicial proceeding, which is
protected under California law.3
California Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 states that com-
munications taking place within a judicial proceeding are afforded a
privilege and thus cannot be subject to non-disclosure actions.4 The
court in ITT applies this code provision to the disclosure of trade
Copyright © 1990 by Ellen C. Arabian.
1. "'Trade secret' means information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (l)Derives in-
dependent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its dis-
closure or use; and (2)Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1989).
2. 214 Cal. App. 3d 307, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1989).
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982).
4. The relevant portion of the statute reads, "A privileged publication or broadcast is
one made ... 2. In any... (2) judicial proceeding." CAL. Civ. CODE § 47 (West 1982).
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secrets and concludes that California Civil Code section 47 provides
an absolute privilege in judicial proceedings for the disclosure of
trade secrets by potential expert witnesses like defendant Dooley.
However, the court holds that a former employee may not disclose
trade secrets to an employer's opponent in a lawsuit when that em-
ployee has agreed in a written contract not to disclose secret or con-
fidential knowledge concerning the Company's business. The court
leaves open the question of whether such an agreement between an
employer and an employee can be implied. The purpose of this
casenote is to highlight the important points made in ITT, and to
suggest areas for further consideration.
II. FACTS
ITT involved a suit by ITT Telecom Products Corporation
against its former employee, Dooley, alleging that Dooley had
breached a contract of confidentiality by discussing company
secrets with a purchaser of ITT's international telephone switching
system, Intercontinental De Communicaciones Por Satelite, S.A.
("Intercomsa"), a Panamanian corporation. Dooley was an em-
ployee of ITT's predecessor company and during that time he
signed a contract agreeing not to publish or disclose any of the
Company's secrets or confidences during or subsequent to his em-
ployment.5 When ITT acquired the assets of the previous company,
it also retained Dooley as an employee. Since ITT acquired the
contract rights of the previous company, Dooley's contract was still
effective.
At the same time Dooley ended his employment with ITT, In-
tercomsa became dissatisfied with ITT's telephone switching system
and demanded arbitration. Intercomsa contacted a consulting firm
to seek assistance in the arbitration and the firm hired Dooley as an
expert consultant. Dooley was hired specifically to aid Intercomsa
in the arbitration. His tasks were to determine whether ITT's
switching system conformed to its product descriptions and
whether the capabilities of the system met the requirements of the
contract between Intercomsa and ITT. In a written report, Dooley
5. The contract provided:
I further agree that I will not, except as required in the conduct of the Com-
pany's business or as authorized in writing on behalf of the Company, publish
or disclose, during such term of employment or subsequent thereto, any secret
or confidential knowledge concerning any invention or other matter relating to
the Company's business which I may in any way acquire by reason of my em-
ployment by the Company.
17T, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
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answered eleven of Intercomsa's inquiries, and instructed In-
tercomsa on the traffic engineering of telephone calls. The knowl-
edge Dooley shared with Intercomsa was based on his own personal
experience and his experience as an employee at ITT. In 1983, In-
tercomsa filed a complaint in a Florida federal district court against
ITT for selling an allegedly defective telephone switching system.
III. PROCEDURE
ITT filed suit in California state court against Dooley alleging
breach of a written contract not to disclose confidential information
obtained during his employment, misappropriation6 of ITT's trade
secrets, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in the written employment contract, unfair competition, and vi-
olation of California Labor Code section 2860.7 The trial court
awarded Dooley summary judgment based on the privilege set forth
in California Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2.8
On appeal, there were only two causes of action at issue:
breach of the written employment contract, and misappropriation
of ITT's trade secrets and proprietary information. The key ques-
tion the court addressed on appeal was whether the privilege of Cal-
ifornia Civil Code section 47 applies even though Dooley expressly
contracted with ITT not to disclose trade secrets.
IV. THE STATUTORY PRIVILEGE AT ISSUE
The purpose of California Civil Code section 47 is "to afford
litigants the utmost freedom of access to the courts to secure and
6. "'Misappropriation' means: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a
person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by
improper means; or (2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
express or implied consent by a person who: (A) Used improper means to ac-
quire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) At the time of disclosure or use,
knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was:
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to
acquire it; (ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) Derived from or through a person who owed
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C)
Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by acci-
dent or mistake."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West Supp. 1989).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 1989): "Everything which an employee acquires by
virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to him from his employer,
belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or unlawfully, or during or after the
expiration of the term of his employment."
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982). See supra text accompanying note 4.
1990"]
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defend their rights without fear of being harassed by actions for def-
amation."9 Communication taking place within a judicial proceed-
ing is privileged if the following factors are met: "the publication (1)
was made in a judicial proceeding; (2) had some connection or logi-
cal relation to the action; (3) was made to achieve the objects of the
litigation; and (4) involved litigants or other participants authorized
by law."'" In addition, the statements must be obtained in good
faith and in contemplation of litigation,"1 and the publication must
have a reasonable relation to the judicial action. 12
The statute's requirement of a "judicial proceeding" has been
interpeted broadly by the courts. The statutory privilege applies to
communications taking place both inside and outside of the court-
room, and "thus, it is not limited to the pleadings, the oral or writ-
ten evidence, to publications in open court or in briefs or
affidavits." 13  The purpose of allowing such a broad definition of
"judicial proceeding" is to promote "the vital public policy of af-
fording free access to the courts and facilitating the crucial func-
tions of the finder of fact." 14
9. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956). Albertson in-
volved a suit alleging that the defendant knowingly and maliciously asserted false claims to
plaintiff's real property and that by recording a notice of lis pendens the defendant caused
disparagement to her title. Id. at 378, 295 P.2d at 407. While the court found the communi-
cation to be privileged under section 47, it recognized that the plaintiff still had a valid cause
of action for malicious prosecution. Id. at 380-82, 295 P.2d at 409-10.
10. Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn, 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 772-73, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 653, 657 (1987) (citing Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818,
825, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1973)). The court in Financial Corp. examined the situation in
which pleadings are filed only to publish defamatory statements. Id. at 774, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
658. Financial Corp. involved a suit against an attorney for intentional interference with
prospective advantage and abuse of process for filing an allegedly defamatory complaint and
for statements made to prospective witnesses and other persons throughout Northern Califor-
nia. The court found the statements made in the complaint and to the witnesses to be privi-
leged, but the statements made to persons not connected to the litigation were found not to be
protected. See also Bradley, 30 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 720, where defendants
filed documents in two courts merely for the purpose of having the news media republish the
defamatory statements. Although the Bradley court acknowledged that there was some rela-
tionship between the documents filed in court and the pending action, the court found that
the pleadings were not filed to achieve the objects of the litigation. Id. at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 723.
11. Financial Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d at 778, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
12. Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 245-46,
293 P.2d 862, 864-65 (1956). The court found that a medical report prepared by a doctor
containing allegedly libelous statements about another doctor was privileged, since it was
prepared due to a litigant's request for use in a judicial proceeding. The court also found that
the privilege extends to statements made in an affidavit filed in a judicial proceeding. Id. at
246, 293 P.2d at 865 (citing Donnell v. Linforth, I 1 Cal. App. 2d 25, 28-29, 52 P.2d 937, 939
(1935)).
13. Albertson, 46 Cal. 2d at 380, 295 P.2d at 409.
14. Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 364-65, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (1985).
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The privilege begins before pleadings are ever filed; "IT]he ab-
solute privilege in both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings ex-
tends to preliminary conversations and interviews between a
prospective witness and an attorney if they are some way related to
or connected with a pending or contemplated action."15 Further-
more, the privilege applies to any publication, "even though the
publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the
court or its officers is invoked."16 In addition, it is of no conse-
quence that it is a witness' testimony at issue rather than a pleading,
since it has been held that "the testimony of a witness in a judicial
proceeding is uniformly accorded the same degree of privilege as is
accorded the pleadings therein". 7
Although the privilege of section 47 appears in the code chap-
ter on defamation, it has been extended to virtually all other causes
of action, except malicious prosecution." Courts had never ad-
dressed the applicability of the privilege to a case of misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, or to a case where an express non-disclosure
agreement exists.' 9 Therefore, the ITT case, which addresses both
misappropriation of trade secrets and an express non-disclosure
agreement, is one of first impression by the court.20 The closest is-
sue that had been addressed is the application of a common law
witness' privilege to an implied contract of confidentiality.21
V. ARGUMENTS BY THE PARTIES AND ANALYSIS BY THE
COURT
A. Applicability of Privilege to Dooley's Communication
ITT's first and weakest argument was that Dooley's statements
were not made to further a judicial proceeding, but were made
solely for compensation.22 The court found this argument unper-
suasive, since the statements were made specifically to assist In-
tercomsa in litigation.23 Furthermore, the fact that Dooley was a
15. Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 865, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (1972).
16. Albertson, 46 Cal. 2d at 381, 295 P.2d at 409.
17. Bernstein, 139 Cal. App. 2d at 246, 293 P.2d at 865.
18. Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 364, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See also Oren Royal Oaks Venture
v. Greenburg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 1164, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567,
571 (1986).
19. I7T, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
20. Id.
21. Bond v. Pecaut, 561 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd without op., 734
F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. 17T 214 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
23. Id. at 315-16, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
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consultant and not a witness or party was of no consequence, since
the privilege has been extended to other potential expert witnesses
such as Dooley.2' The court concluded that the privilege of Califor-
nia Civil Code section 47 applied to Dooley's communications to
Intercomsa.25
B. Applicability of the Privilege in Light of the Written
Contract
After concluding that Dooley's statements were of the type
covered by the section 47 privilege, the court examined whether the
privilege had the force to override a written contract prohibiting the
disclosure of trade secrets.26 The court concluded that although the
statutory privilege applied to Dooley's disclosure of trade secrets,
the express non-disclosure agreement between Dooley and ITT
would prohibit the disclosure and override the statutory privilege.27
In its analysis, the court balanced the policy reasons favoring
application of the privilege2 ' with ITT's property interest in trade
secrets and its interest in being able to enforce valid contracts.29
The court pointed out that "trade secrets have been recognized as a
constitutionally protected intangible property interest", 30 and that
the California Evidence Code section 1060 specifically provides for
the protection of trade secrets. 3  An interesting observation made
by the court is that Evidence Code section 1060 vests in the owner
of a trade secret a privilege against disclosure, but "imposes
no.. .duty on an employee or other party to a trade secret to claim
the owner's privilege against disclosure".32 Therefore, this section
would be of no value unless an employer could assert his or her
24. Id. at 314, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (citing Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medi-
cal Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d at 245-47, 293 P.2d at 864-66 (doctor's report on another doctor's
performance)); See also Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 386, 393-
94, 182 Cal. Rptr. 438,442 (1982) (toxicologist's report); Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal. App. 3d
907, 913-16, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698, 701-03 (1987) (expert accountant's report).
25. 1TT, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 317, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
26. Id. at 318-19, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 779-80.
27. Id. at 320, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 780-81.
28. One policy reason is the necessity of full disclosure for the fact finder in a judicial
proceeding. See infra p. 118 & note 14.
29. IT, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 319-20, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790-81.
30. Id. at 318, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1001-04 (1984)).
31. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1060 (West 1966). This section reads as follows: "If he or his
agent or employee claims the privilege, the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege
will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice."
32. ITT, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
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privilege against disclosure by contractually creating a duty of
nondisclosure.33
ITT asserted that since trade secrets were a constitutionally
protected intangible property interest, the case of Cutter v. Brown-
bridge should be followed. In Cutter, the court declared, "we con-
strue section 47, subdivision 2, as providing no blanket immunity
for causes of action based upon constitutional violations".34 The
Cutter court went on to say that "[we] have determined that the
constitutional right to privacy outweighs the policies underlying the
judicial proceedings immunity when private material is voluntarily
published, without resort to a prior judicial determination".35
The ITT court explored the similarities and differences be-
tween the Cutter case and the present case and concluded that the
statutory privilege did not override the express nondisclosure agree-
ment. The court in ITT observed that while Cutter revealed some
similarities helpful to the resolution of the present case, it was dis-
tinguishable from the present case because the witness, a psycho-
therapist, volunteered the information, as opposed to providing it
pursuant to a subpoena or other request in a judicial proceeding.36
Furthermore, Cutter did not exclude the testimony because of an
express nondisclosure agreement, but instead relied upon the statu-
tory duty of non-disclosure for psychotherapists.37 Despite these
dissimilarities, the ITT court concluded that ITT's express nondis-
closure agreement operated in the same fashion as a statutory obli-
gation to override the privilege.3" Thus, while the ITT court
explored differences between the Cutter case and the present case, it
nevertheless used the Cutter decision by analogy to conclude that
the nondisclosure agreement overrides the statutory privilege.
33. Id.
34. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 847, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 553 (1986).
The case involved a suit by a patient against his psychotherapist for volunteering information
concerning the diagnosis to the patient's former wife. Id. at 840, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The
information was used for the purpose of assisting the patient's former wife in an action to
suspend the patient's visitation rights with his children. The patient claimed that the psycho-
therapist committed a breach of his constitutional and common law rights of privacy, and a
breach of the implied covenant of confidentiality he had with his psychotherapist. Id. at 840,
288 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
35. Id. at 848, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
36. 17T, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
37. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1027 (West 1966); But see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060
(West 1966), dealing with trade secrets, provides no such duty of non-disclosure.
38. I, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
1990]
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C. Application of the Privilege to the Tort of
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
After concluding that the express agreement between Dooley
and ITT prohibited Dooley from disclosing the company's trade
secrets, the court examined whether the privilege would apply to a
tort claim of misappropriation of trade secrets.39 The court con-
trasted tort law with contract law, and pointed out that "[tiort law
may be viewed as attempting to define the terms of the unwritten
social contract that binds members of a society together."'' 4 On the
other hand, actions based on contract law are more concerned with
enforcing promises and protecting the expectations of the parties.4
Because of the differences between tort law and contract law,
and the fact that the code section has been held to provide immu-
nity from various tort actions,42 the court concluded that the privi-
lege of section 47 is more applicable to cases arising out of tort law
than contract law.4 3 Furthermore, the court pointed out that an
obligation of non-disclosure imposed by tort law should not over-
ride the witness' privilege of speaking candidly in judicial proceed-
ings.' The court concluded, "we hold the privilege applies to ITT's
tort claim of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets."'45
VI. AREAS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
While the court was clear in its holding that California Civil
Code section 47, subdivision 2 applies to the disclosure of trade
secrets unless there is an express non-disclosure agreement prohibit-
ing such a disclosure, the court failed to say how explicit the non-
disclosure agreement must be in order to override the statutory
privilege. For example, can an employer claim that an implied non-
disclosure agreement qualifies as a waiver of the statutory privilege?
Since the statutory privilege has been found applicable to various
claims involving breaches of confidence, the court suggested that
such an agreement may not qualify. However, the court left this
question open for further debate.46
39. Id. at 321-23, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 781-82.
40. Id. at 322, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
41. Id. at 322, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167, 176, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980)).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
43. See id. at 323, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 322-23, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (citing Lebbos v. State Bar, 165 Cal. App. 3d
656, 667, 211 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (1985) (court observed that the section 47 privilege has
[Vol. 6
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VII. CONCLUSION
ITT Telecom Products Corporation v. Dooley addressed the ap-
plicability of the judicial proceeding privilege to the disclosure of
trade secrets by a former employee in the context of a judicial pro-
ceeding.47 While the court declared that the privilege applies to the
disclosure of trade secrets, an express nondisclosure agreement be-
tween employee and employer would prohibit such a disclosure and
override the statutory privilege. Absent such an express agreement,
an employee, or former employee, would be statutorily protected
under California law from claims arising from the disclosure of an
employer's trade secrets in the context of a judicial proceeding.
Ellen C. Arabian
provided immunity from a variety of tort actions based on communications disclosed during
a judicial proceeding)); See also Bond v. Pecaut, 561 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (N.D. I1. 1983),
which determined that a common law witnesses' privilege in a judicial proceeding, as opposed
to a statutory privilege like section 47, applies to a breach of an implied confidentiality con-
tract. However, no cases apply the section 47 privilege to an implied agreement of
confidentiality.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982).
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COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND THE WORKS MADE
FOR HIRE DOCTRINE: THE SUPREME COURT
ADOPTS THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989)
INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 1989, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court adopted
what has been termed the "literal interpretation"' of the "works
made for hire ' provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act3 (hereinafter
the Act). In doing so, the Court rejected several other interpreta-
tions endorsed by the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits.' The Court held that the creator of a work is an "employee"
under the work for hire doctrine only if he or she would be consid-
ered an "employee" under the general common law principles of
agency as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.'
Under this test, if the creator is determined to be an "employee,"
then the product is a work for hire under section 101(1) of the
Copyright Act.6 If, however, the creator is not an "employee," then
the creator is, by default, an "independent contractor," and the
Copyright @ 1990 by Melissa A. Finoechio.
1. This view was initially endorsed by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Soc'y for Crip-
pled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
2. Although the Act terms the doctrine as "works made for hire," in the interest of
ease, the term "works for hire" will be used for the purposes of this note.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172
(1989).
5. Id. at 2178. The Court cites the following section of the Restatement of Agency in
support of its definition of "employee":
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only
if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space
limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
6. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2179. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See also infra note 18.
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work for hire doctrine is applicable only if the terms of section
101(2) are satisfied.7
The significance of the work for hire doctrine is profound in
determining copyright ownership. The Copyright Act bestows
upon the owner of a copyright five valuable and exclusive rights
regarding the disposition of the particular work.8 Ownership under
the Act "vests initially in the author of the work." 9 Generally, the
author is the individual who actually creates the work.10 The work
for hire doctrine is an important exception to this general rule. If
the product is a work for hire, then "the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" and
therefore, the owner of the copyright."
The work for hire doctrine and the newly adopted literal inter-
pretation will have a significant impact in any industry that utilizes
the help of freelance workers such as writers, artists, designers, or
computer programmers. This note will follow the Court's analysis
in arriving at the literal construction of the work for hire doctrine
and address some of the issues that this ruling left unresolved.
THE FACTS
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (hereinafter
CCNV v. Reid) involved a dispute over copyright ownership in a
statue between the creating artist, Reid, and the commissioning or-
ganization, CCNV. The facts, though lengthy, must be considered
closely because the Court's ultimate decision rests on the commer-
cial relationship between Reid and CCNV. 2 In the fall of 1985,
CCNV decided to contribute a display to the Washington, D.C. an-
nual Christmas Pageant of Peace. CCNV conceived an idea for the
display depicting the plight of the homeless in the form of a modem
nativity scene. Instead of the traditional figures, CCNV envisioned
a sculpture of a black family, two adults and an infant, huddled on a
streetside steam grate. CCNV determined the dimensions of the
7. CCNV 109 S. Ct. at 2179. See also infra note 18.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). These five rights are: to reproduce the
work; to prepare derivative works; to distribute copies of the work; to perform the work; and
to display the work. Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). To create under the Act means to translate
an idea into a fixed, tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982 & Supp. V 987). The parties must also agree in writing
that the work is a work for hire. Id.
12. These are the facts as recited by the Court. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2168-71.
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piece and entitled it "Third World America" with "and there is no
room at the inn" inscribed on the sculpture's pedestal.
CCNV looked for an artist to make the statue. After some
searching, CCNV offered the job to Reid. Reid agreed to create the
statue, and CCNV agreed to build the pedestal and steam grate.
Reid suggested that the piece be made of bronze, but CCNV re-
jected the idea due to lack of funds. Reid then recommended a syn-
thetic substance with which to mold the work and CCNV agreed.
The price settled upon -was $15,000 for cost of materials, and Reid
donated his artistic skills.
From his studio in Maryland, Reid sent CCNV a sketch of his
vision of the proposed statue. Reid testified that he sent the sketch
at the request of CCNV so that CCNV could use the sketch to raise
money for the project. CCNV representatives testified that the
sketch was also sent for the purpose of obtaining CCNV's approval.
CCNV recommended a particular family to use as models and sug-
gested, contrary to Reid's sketch, that the family be depicted in a
reclining position on the steam grate. Reid adopted both of these
suggestions.
During the month of November and part of December, various
CCNV representatives went to Maryland to check on Reid's pro-
gress. During one of these visits, CCNV rejected Reid's idea of us-
ing suitcases and paper bags to hold the personal belongings of the
family and, instead, insisted that Reid use a shopping cart for this
purpose.
At no time during their relationship was the issue of copyright
ownership discussed by Reid or CCNV. On December 24, 1985,
Reid delivered the finished sculpture to CCNV in Washington,
D.C. where it was united with the pedestal and the steam grate pre-
pared by CCNV. The piece was thereafter placed on display in the
Christmas pageant.
In late January, 1986, CCNV returned the statue to Reid for
repairs. CCNV made plans to take the sculpture on tour in order to
raise money for the homeless. When CCNV asked Reid to return
the statue in March, he refused. Reid then filed a certificate of
copyright registration for the sculpture in his name and announced
plans to take it on his own tour. CCNV immediately filed a com-
peting certificate of copyright registration.
After filing its competing certificate, CCNV filed suit against
Reid seeking return of the statue and a resolution of copyright own-
ership. The District Court ruled that "Third World America" was
a work for hire under section 101 of the Act and that CCNV was
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therefore, the owner of the copyright in the statue.13 The Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed and held under a literal interpretation
of the work for hire doctrine that Reid was not an "employee" and
therefore, the piece was not a work for hire.1 4 The court suggested
that the work may have been jointly authored"5 and remanded the
case for resolution of that issue. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari 1 6 in order to resolve the conflict among the circuit courts re-
garding the proper interpretation of the work for hire doctrine.
THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK FOR HIRE
DOCTRINE: THE "CONTROL" AND "SALARIED EMPLOYEE"
TESTS REJECTED
The Court's analysis of the work for hire doctrine focused on
the language, structure, and legislative history of the work for hire
provisions of the Act."7 Although there are two situations under
which a work can be a work for hire, by election of the Court, the
inquiry was limited to the proper construction of section 101(1)
only.' Section 101(1) describes a work for hire as "a work pre-
pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."' 19
Adopting the common law of agency definition of "employee," the
Court ruled that "Third World America" was not created by Reid
as an employee of CCNV.20
13. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456-57 (D. D.
C. 1987).
14. Community for Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
15. A joint work is "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The authors of a joint work are considered co-
owners of the copyright in that work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
16. 488 U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
17. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2178.
18. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2171. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) defines a work
for hire as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as
a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
.text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties ex-
pressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
Because the sculpture does not fit into one of the nine categories, CCNV never con-
tended, nor did the Court ever consider, that the work was a work for hire under section
101(2).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20. CCNV 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
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The Court began its analysis by reciting the four interpreta-
tions of the work for hire doctrine that have emerged from the cir-
cuit courts.21 The first view, which was asserted by CCNV, holds
that a work is made by an employee whenever the hiring party re-
tains the right to control the final product.2 The second construc-
tion is a variation of the first and was also asserted by CCNV. This
interpretation holds a work is prepared by an employee when the
hiring party actually exercises control over the work.23 The third
view, and the view endorsed by the Court, gives the term "em-
ployee" a common law of agency meaning.24 The fourth position,
the view adopted by Reid, holds that "employee" refers only to for-
mal, salaried employees.2 5
The first layer of the Court's inquiry into the proper construc-
tion of the work for hire doctrine was an examination of the lan-
guage of the Act. The terms "employee" and "scope of
employment" are not defined by the Act.2 6 Citing authority com-
pelling it to do so, the Court looked to common law in order to
ascertain the proper construction of the two terms.27 The Court
asserted, "In the past, when Congress has used the term 'employee'
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood
by common law agency doctrine."28 In addition, the term "scope of
employment" is a specific term of art used in agency law.2 9 Accord-
ing to the Court, section 101(1)'s use of this term suggests a con-
gressional intent to incorporate the agency law definition of
"employee" into the Act.3° Finally, the Court points to the Act's
express goal of establishing a uniform copyright law. 31 The Court
contended that adopting a general common law of agency meaning,
rather than relying on the law of a particular state, fits this congres-
21. Id. at 2172.
22. Id. at 2172 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (Colo. 1985) and
Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
23. Id. (citing Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810
F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); and Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889
(7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986)).
24. Id. (citing CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988) and Easter Seal Soc'y for
Crippled Children and Adults of La. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987)).
25. Id. (citing Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989)).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2173.
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sional goal of uniformity.32
Having adopted the common law agency definition of "em-
ployee," the Court addressed the conflicting constructions of the
work for hire doctrine. The two control-focused tests could not
pass scrutiny in light of the Court's literal interpretation of section
101. 33 One of the Court's primary reasons for rejecting the control
tests was that such tests erroneously focus on the commercial rela-
tionship between the hiring party and the work instead of focusing
on the relationship between the parties as the language and structure
of section 101 dictates. 4 Also, the control tests ignore the clearly
articulated dichotomy established by section 101 between works
created in the scope of employment and specially commissioned
works.35
Section 101 sets forth two distinct situations under which the
work for hire doctrine operates. The second of these situations, de-
scribed in section 101(2), specifically enumerates nine categories of
works to which the work for hire doctrine applies.36 The Court
argued that specially ordered works, by their definition, include the
right of the commissioning party to exercise control over produc-
tion of the work.37 If control by the hiring party is the determining
factor, then section 101(2) would, in many instances, be redundant
and unnecessary because the works would already be considered
works for hire under section 101(1).38 The control tests create a
significant amount of overlap between sections 101(1) and 101(2)
which, according to the Court, is inconsistent with the structure of
the Act.3 9 In addition to the Act ignoring the distinction between
employee and commissioned works, the Court found no language in
the Act supporting any kind of control test construction. 40
The Court concluded its rejection of the control tests by citing
considerable legislative history demonstrating congressional intent
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2174. In a footnote the Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit's formal salaried
test. The Court conceded that there exists some legislative history suggesting the validity of
this approach, but the language of § 101(1) does not support such an interpretation. Id. at
2174 n.8.
34. Id. at 2173.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 18. These categories were chosen because they typically are pre-
pared at the "instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or producer." By their very nature,
these types of works include the hiring party's right to control production. CCNV, 109 S. Ct.
at 2173.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2174.
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to retain the two mutually exclusive grounds upon which a work for
hire claim can be made.41 Not only did Congress retain the em-
ployee versus commissioned works distinction through various revi-
sions of the Act, but a contrary reading in favor of a control test
would violate the Act's goal of predictability of copyright owner-
ship.42 Because the control tests turn on events that occur during
production of a work, the parties would not be certain of copyright
ownership until somewhere in the middle or at the end of their rela-
tionship.43 In addition, the control tests would allow a hiring party
to usurp copyright ownership of a work not falling into one of the
nine categories under section 101(2) simply by demonstrating some
degree of control over the production of the work.' With such an
easily met burden, hiring parties may end up with copyright inter-
ests for which they did not rightfully contract.45
To summarize, the Court rejected the "control" and "salaried
employee" tests because they are not supported by the language of
the Act, they are inconsistent with the structure of the Act, and
they are contrary to congressional intent.46 In applying the work
for hire doctrine under a literal interpretation, a court should deter-
mine under the common law of agency whether the hired party is
an employee or an independent contractor. 47 After resolving this
preliminary issue, the court can apply either the employee subsec-
tion or the commissioned works subsection of 101 in order to deter-
mine copyright ownership.48
EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: APPLYING THE
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Although no single factor is determinative, the Court recited
several variables which are relevant in determining whether a hired
party is an employee under the common law of agency.49 These
factors are: the hiring party's right to control production; the skill
required to perform the task; the source of the tools used; the place
where the work is done; the duration of the relationship between the
41. Id. at 2174-78.
42. Id. at 2178.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Easter Seal Soe'y for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Play-
boy Enters., 815 F.2d 333 (1987)).
45. Id.
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id at 2178-79.
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parties; the hiring party's right to assign additional projects to the
worker; the degree of control the hiring party has over when and for
how long the hired party works; the manner of payment; the hired
party's power to hire and pay assistants; whether the project is re-
lated to the hiring party's regular course of business; the type of
benefits received by the hired party; and the tax treatment of the
hired party.50
In applying these factors to the relationship between CCNV
and Reid, the Court unreservedly concluded that Reid was not an
employee of CCNV, but an independent contractor.51 Although
CCNV had control over Reid's work to the extent it could insist the
sculpture met certain specifications, the Court noted that control by
itself is not determinative. The Court then cited the following fac-
tors as evidence against CCNV's contention that Reid was its em-
ployee: the high level of skill required to sculpt; Reid used his own
tools; he worked in his own studio in Maryland; their relationship
lasted only two months; CCNV had no authority to assign addi-
tional projects to Reid; Reid was free to hire and pay assistants as
he wished; the hours that Reid worked were totally at his own dis-
cretion; he received none of the standard employee benefits; creating
sculptures was not within CCNV's regular course of business; and
had Reid not donated his services, he would have been paid a fixed
sum payable at the completion of the project.52 The Court gave no
indication as to which of the factors, or in what combination, it
found to be most probative. The Court nonetheless found the sum
total of these facts to be overwhelming in favor of finding Reid to be
an independent contractor and not an employee of CCNV.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE
WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
Although the Court settled the question of the proper defini-
tion of employee under section 101(1), its decision leaves several
issues regarding the application of the work for hire doctrine unan-
swered. Even after this ruling, the problems of predictability of
copyright ownership, the proper construction of section 101(2), and
possibility of a joint authorship conclusion still infest the work for
hire doctrine.
The Court's literal approach requires the circuit courts to con-
50. Id. It should be noted that the Court borrows from both the control tests and the
formal salaried test in reciting the controlling factors under the literal approach.
51. Id at 2179.
52. Id
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sider a myriad of factors in determining whether or not a hired
party is an employee under section 101(1). The Court neither
guides the lower courts regarding the probative weight of any of the
recited factors, nor does the Court suggest how many of the factors
must exist in order for the scales to tilt in either the employee or
independent contractor direction. Due to this lack of guidance, fu-
ture applications of the literal approach will be fact-intensive, case
by case exercises leaving both the worker and the hiring party un-
comfortably uncertain regarding copyright ownership.
This inherent uncertainty in the literal approach to the work
for hire doctrine is directly contrary to the Act's goal of providing
predictability of copyright ownership at the outset of a project. It is
ironic that predictability and consistency were major policy reasons
for the Court's rejection of the control tests when the literal ap-
proach does very little to advance this congressional purpose. As
with the control test, the events determining whether or not the
hired party is an employee will not occur until "late in the process,
if not until the work is completed." '53 Parties will be no more able
to predict the status of the hired party at the outset of a project
under the literal interpretation than they would under either of the
control tests.
Another unfinished aspect of the CCNV v. Reid decision is the
Court's election not to construe the meaning of section 101(2)"4 in
any significant detail. Besides restating the nine categories of works
enumerated by the section, the Court avoids resolving the ambigu-
ity surrounding the scope and meaning of those categories. Even
where a court is able to determine with certainty that the hired
party is an independent contractor and not an employee, it is still
left with the confusing task of characterizing the work at issue in
relation to the nine categories of section 101(2). Except in cases
where the work clearly does not fit into any of the categories, as in
CCNVv. Reid, the lower courts will have to make difficult decisions
regarding the scope of the categories. Without any guidance from
the Supreme Court, these lower court decisions will undoubtedly
conflict, resulting in inconsistent application of the work for hire
doctrine.
This ambiguity regarding the nine categories may have a par-
ticularly interesting impact on the computer software industry.
Although computer programs are classified as "literary works"
under the Act, the status of computer programs is yet undetermined
53. Id. at 2178.
54. See supra note 18.
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in many contexts. 55 As suggested in an article by Henry Beck, com-
puter programs can arguably fall into any one of the nine categories
of section 101(2).56 As the use of computer software permeates day
to day business and personal activities, courts will inevitably be
faced with the problem of classifying various types of works as they
exist in this new and ever changing medium. Given the Court's
common law of agency definition of employee, the uncertainty re-
garding the scope of the nine categories, and the yet undetermined
status of software under the Act, copyright ownership in specially
ordered programs may end up in the hands of the programmer in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
The final issue left for the circuit courts is the question of joint
authorship. On remand, the district court will have to determine
whether the sculpture was created by CCNV and Reid "with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or in-
terdependent parts of a unitary whole."5" After rejecting the con-
trol tests because they failed to focus on the commercial
relationship between the parties, the Court asks the district court to
put aside the employee-employer aspects of the relationship and to
focus on the intent of the parties.5 8 This shift of focus may suggest
that the Court has reservations regarding the fairness of giving
Reid, or any independent contractor, exclusive copyright in the
work when the facts indicate that such an outcome was never in-
55. A computer program is defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987). Literary works include works "expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal
or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied (emphasis added). Id. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) where the court held: "Thus, a computer program, whether in
object or source code, is a 'literary work'. . ." Id. at 1249.
56. Mr. Beck gives the following as examples in support of his contention:
Among the categories enumerated by the statute are "contributions to collec-
tive works" (arguably, modules of larger programs), parts of a "motion picture
or audiovisual work" (arguably, software designed to generate screen displays),
"compilations" (arguably including arrangements of public domain materials
such as "freeware"), "translations" (arguably, translations which port pro-
grams from one operating system/hardware platform to another), "supplemen-
tary works" (arguably, enhancements to existing programs) "instructional
texts" (arguably, including computer documentation).
Beck, Haifa Loaf- Supreme Court Work for Hire Decision Leaves Many Questions Unan-
swered, 6 THE COMPUTER LAW. 37, 40 (1989).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58. The Act's definition of joint works requires a court to look to the intention of the
parties at the time the contract, if any, is executed and the existence of a collaborative intent
on behalf of the parties. GINSBURG, GORMAN & LATMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES
229 (2d ed. 1985).
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tended by the hiring party. Perhaps by remanding the case for a
resolution of the joint authorship issue, the Court is creating a new
step in the work for hire analysis to be triggered by interests of eq-
uity and fairness.
CONCLUSION
The Court's literal construction of section 101 will make it
tougher for hiring parties to ensure copyright ownership in works
which they farm out to independent contractors. The literal ap-
proach may have particular impact on the high technology industry
where the status of many of its mediums of expression is yet unset-
tled under copyright law. The cleanest way to settle the issue of
copyright ownership when using freelance workers is to execute an
agreement at the outset of the project determining in whom the in-
terests will vest.
One commentator on the issue of copyright ownership agree-
ments suggests that such an agreement should not only declare the
proposed work to be a "work made for hire," but also include a
clause which compels the hired party to transfer all his rights in the
work over to the hiring party in the event that the circumstances of
their relationship do not satisfy the work for hire doctrine.59
Although such an agreement may guarantee the hiring party copy-
right ownership, California employment laws may require that the
hired party now an "employee" via the contract, receive full em-
ployee benefits from the hiring party.'
In addition to the literal interpretation of the work for hire
doctrine creating more hoops through which hiring parties must
jump in order to secure copyright ownership, its retrospective, fact-
intensive analysis may also unfairly endow copyright ownership on
either the worker or the hiring party when such an outcome was
never intended by the parties. The Court has, however, left open a
window through which equitable considerations may enter the anal-
ysis by allowing the possibility of a joint authorship outcome.
Although it remains to be seen how the lower courts will carry out
the ruling of CCNV v. Reid, it seems the decision not only deter-
mined the proper construction of the term "employee" under sec-
59. Karlen, To Hire of Not to Hire? A Critique of C. C.N. V v. Reid, 14 NEW MATrER
2, 22 (1989).
60. The possible ramifications of the work for hire doctrine in the area of employment
laW is well beyond the scope of this casenote. For an overview of the employment law issues,
see Victoroff, Poetic Justice: California "Work Made for Hire" Laws Invite State Regulation
of Parties to Copyright Contracts, 14 NEw MATrER 3 (1989).
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tion 101(1), but also added a new joint works prong to the work for
hire analysis.
Melissa A. Finocchio
